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TRANSFERS OF JOINT PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
A CALL FOR IMMEDIATE STATUTORY REVISION

L. Hart Wrigh_t*
OR years the Tax Court sided with the government and the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in asserting that the
contemplation-of-death provision1 of the estate tax act was sufficiently elastic to include the tax concept of ownership reflected
in the joint-property provision2 of the same act.8 The alliance between those tribunals on this point was recently broken, however, when the Tax Court shifted to the competing view supported by taxpayers4 and the appellate court for the Ninth Circuit.5 It now believes that the two provisions mentioned above
are complete strangers even though at one time these two were
consecutive subsections of the same section.6 The consequence, if
that court is right: Certain inter vivos arrangements, though entered into in contemplation of death, will effectively and substantially reduce anticipated estate taxes which would otherwise
be assessed. This saving is effected by an exclusion from the
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• Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1939, LL.B. 1941, University of
Oklahoma, LL.M. 1942, University of Michigan.-Ed.
I.R.C. (1939), §811 (c), now I.R.C., §2035.
21.R.C. (1939), §811 (e), now I.R.C., §2040.
s Cf. Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, (3d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d)
653, cert. den. 321 U.S. 764, 64 S.Ct. 521 (1944): Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961
(1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d} 657; Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943)
(acq.): Estate of William MacPherson Hornor, 44 B.T.A. 1136 (1941) (nonacq.), alfd. (3d
Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 649. Cf. also Estate of Edwin W. Rickenberg, 11 T.C. 1 (1948), revd.
(9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den. 338 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 487 (1950).
4Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955): Estate of A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C.
No. 70 (1955): Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.). affd. on other
issues (9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400.
5 Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 657. Cf. Rickenberg
v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den. 338 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 487
(1950). See also Baltimore Nat. Bank, Exrs. v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp.
l

642.
6 Revenue

Act of 1916, §202 (b) and (c).
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gross estate and will, if the arrangement is properly planned, be
in addition to that expected from the marital deduction.
The Tax Court was concerned with the death duties to be
exacted from the estates of two different husbands, each of whom
during life had furnished the entire cost of acquiring certain
property which each then held for several years with his wife
as tenants by the entireties.
Decedent X and his wife W, shortly before and "in contemplation of his death," executed ·the necessary instruments to effect
an immediate division of their entireties property between them.
The Commissioner's determination, calling for inclusion of the
entire property in the decedent-husband's gross estate, was rejected. The Tax Court concluded that W's interest should be
excluded from her husband's gross estate even though the whole
would have been included under the joint property provision had
the arrangement in contemplation of his death not been effected.7
Decedent Y and his wife W, in contemplation · also of his
death, established a trust with the property which they had held
as tenants by the entireties. The income from the trust was to
be divided between them for their joint lives, then to the survivor
for his life, remainder over. Again the court upset the Commissioner's determination by holding that the parties had successfully reduced that amount which otherwise would have been included in the husband's gross estate under the joint-property
provision. Now only the one-half which, according to local law,
he had transferred to the trust was includible at his death. 8

Proper Tax Policy. Policy-wise these decisions obviously
give rise to absurd results. From the inception of the estate tax,
the act has required the value of entireties property to be included
in the gross estate of a decedent in the proportion to which he
had furnished the consideration for the original acquisition.9
Inclusion of the whole in H's gross estate where he had furnished
the entire consideration did not mean that the draftsman of that
section was ignorant of the fact that under local law H's wife
had acquired some sort of interest in the corpus before his death.
A tax on the entire value was justified, in spite of that fact, on
7 Estate

of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955).
s Estate of A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. No. 70 (1955). Cf. Estate of Don Murillo Brockway.
18 T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.), affd. on other issues (9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400.
9Revenue Act of 1916, §202(c), now I.R.C., §2040.
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the theory that H's death .was really the pivotal event which
brought to fruition W's interest in the corpus, as distinguished
from any income interest she may·have had. If she had died.first,
her chance to get the fee, a matter dependent solely upon survivorship, wo11ld have been cut off. Since H's death alone made
W's interest in the corpus certain, such estates were deemed by
Congress to be sufficiently testamentary in character to warrant
taxing them as though H had held the entire fee until the very
moment of his death.10
The decedents in the two·cases before the Tax Court sought
to avoid this latter equation, that is, sought to avoid the impact
of the statutory language dealing with jointly held property by
concluding a second inter vivos arrangement which eliminated the
joint character of their estate. Normally, of course, the estate
tax act does not freeze tax incidence according to the original
way in which a taxpayer may have held his property. One is
usually free to re-arrange his affairs during his life and to expect
that death duties will be determined in accordance with that
re-arrangement. But this is only generally true. Again from the
inception of the estate tax, the act has also incorporated a special
provision designed to reach certain inter vivos arrangements entered into in contemplation of death.11 Here, too, the underlying
conception has rested on the testamentary flavor of such arrangements.12 That the contemplation-of-death principle equates with
ordinary testamentary transfers those transactions which are inter
vivos primarily only in terms of ·form is another way of saying
that the contemplation-of-death principle is essential in preserving the integrity of the estate tax theory against unwarranted
avoidance.
If it is assumed, as it is here, that both of the statutory provisions just described deserve to be retained in the code,13 sound
10 This was the explanation made of that section by the Supreme Court when it
turned aside charges of unconstitutionality. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 59
S.Ct. 551 (1939). Thus the joint-property provision is geared to the same basic philosophy
as that which was attn"buted to I.R.C. (1939), §811 (c) (1) (C), now I.R.C., §2037. Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
11 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (b), now I.R.C., §2035.
12 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S.Ct. 446 (1931).
13 However, aside from the basic problem considered here, the joint-property provision should also be amended for the purpose of deleting one clause. In determining who
furnished the original consideration, that section now provides that any part of the consideration literally furnished by the survivor will be attributed to the decedent if it is
shown that the consideration in question was acquired "at any time" by the survivor from
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tax policy requires that the contemplation-of-death principle be
sufficiently broad in its conception to protect the joint-property
provision as well as those other subsections which serve to identify
the gross estate. This means that the ownership and transfer
principles of the joint-property provision-nothing more nor less
than tax concepts-must be imported by construction or amendment into the contemplation-of-death provision. In a loose sense,
this would in effect neutralize for tax purposes any inter vivos
arrangement affecting entireties property where the arrangement
was entered into in contemplation of the death of that tenant
who furnished the original consideration.14 The whole of joint
or entireties property would then be included in his gross estate
if such would have been the case under the joint-property provision absent the later and now neutralized transaction.
If the tax concept of the joint-property provision is not
imported into the contemplation-of-death provision, then the
whole purpose of the former can be easily and intentionally defeated by a taxpayer up until the very moment before his death
by effecting another arrangement which is equally testamentary
in character because entered into in contemplation of his death.
the decedent without full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. This
attributes to a decedent consideration which the survivor may have owned as completely
separate property for many years. See Estate of N. Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945) (acq.).
Similar statutory language is not contained in I.R.C. (1954), §2037 where, absent the
applicability of the Step Transactions Doctrine, the survivor, not the decedent, would be
deemed the transferor in such case. Since, with reference to interests in the corpus, jointly
held property is similar in all economic respects to the types of situations covered by
§2037 [see, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940)], the two should
"have the same general transfer concept.
14 That this would be true only in a loose sense stems from the fact that in some
situations complete neutralization would have effects over and beyond that which would
follow if nothing more is said than that the words "interest" and "transfer" in the contemplation-of-death provision will be deemed to embrace the ownership and transfer
concept of the joint-property provision. Illustratively, consider the effect of complete
neutralization on a transfer of jointly held property by the two tenants in contemplation
of one tenant's death, the income therefrom to be accumulated until his death, the corpus
and income to be distributed then to S and his heirs. If the decedent had furnished the
consideration with which the jointly held property was acquired, complete neutralization
of the subsequent arrangement would also result in including in the gross estate at least
one-half and perhaps all of the accumulated income as well as all of the original corpus.
However, the reference in the contemplation-of-death provision to an "interest" of which
the "decedent" has made a transfer has been construed as a limitation which serves to
exclude all of the accumulated income from the decedent's gross estate. Burns v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 739. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of James D. McDermott, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 665; Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40 B.T.A. 181
(1939), modified and affd. (2d Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 469, cert. den. 314 U.S. 621, 62 S.Ct.
66 (1941). The point is that one can ·argue that the "transfer" concept of the contempla·
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Just as two wrongs never make a right, so two transactions,111
both of which are essentially testamentary in character, can hardly
produce a result to which we can even in part justifiably assign
an inter vivos complexion for tax purposes.

Identification of the Precise Statutory Issue. There are three
main types of inter vivos arrangements which could involve substantial estate tax savings under the Tax Court's theory even
though such transactions were entered into just before and in contemplation of the husband's death:
(1) Hand W could go through the necessary procedure to
divide between them the entireties property originally
acquired with H's funds. They might, e.g., emerge as
tenants in common;
(2) H could transfer his undivided entireties interest to W;
or
(3) H and W could transfer their respective interests to S
and his heirs.16
The first interpretative difficulty in determining on the husband's death the present estate tax consequences of all three
tion-of-death provision should embrace the transfer concept of the joint-property provision without arguing that the word "transfer" in the former is without any limiting effect
at all. That is not to say as a matter of policy and as a general proposition that the
contemplation-of-death principle should not be so designed as to reach the accumulated
income in such cases.
Complete neutralization, as distinguished from importation of the joint-property
transfer concept, might also lead to inclusion in the gross estate of the amount of the gift
tax which the decedent earlier paid the federal government and with reference to which he
would be entitled to a credit if the whole of the joint property is also included in his
gross estate. I.R.C., §2012.
llS The first is the creation of the joint estate; the second is the joint transfer in contemplation of the first tenant's death.
16 The exact extent by which death duties will be reduced because of the exclusion
permitted under the Tax Court's theory will depend upon a variety of circumstances.
Indeed, in some cases there will be no saving at all. Assume, e.g., that prior to the
execution of the final arrangement, the husband's anticipated adjusted gross estate, consisting only of jointly held property p~rchased by him, is $120,000. A division of that
property during life would not reduce the death duty at all if it is intended that the wife
is eventually to get his whole estate. In that case, the exemption and the marital deduction, standing alone, would have immunized the whole at his death. On the other hand,
if the anticipated adjusted gross estate had been $240,000, the exemption and the marital
deduction would have freed only $180,000 from tax. But a division of the property during
life, the retained one-half going to W at H's death, would free the whole $240,000 from
death duties.
In computing anticipated overall savings from a plan which relies upon the Tax
Court's theory, account must also be taken of the possible gift tax implications of the
plan.

6

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

such arrangements is attributable to differences in the literal
language of the two sections under consideration. The provision
dealing with jointly held property does not literally provide that
where one joint tenant furnished the entire consideration, he
sh'.311 be deemed to have been the owner in fee for purposes of the
whole estate tax act. The literal approach of that section is less
sweeping. Where one tenant furnished the original consideration, the act simply provides that the entire value of such entireties property held at his death shall be included in his gross
estate.17 On the other hand, the provision regarding contemplation of death has literally called only for inclusion of that
"interest ... of which the decedent has ... made a transfer ...
in contemplation of his death."18
In cases where the husband during his life transferred his own
undivided entireties· interest to W or where they jointly transferred their total interests to T, the joint property provision was
no longer directly applicable at the moment of his death.19 And
where these arrangements were executed in contemplation of H's
death, his executor later contended, and the Tax Court held, that
the only interest .which the decedent in fact ·transferred in that
contemplation was an undivided one-half interest. Accordingly,
only that one-half was included in his gross estate.20 And where
H ·and W divided their entireties property between themselves,
emerging perhaps as tenants in common, H's executor contended,
and the Tax Court agreed, that H transferred nothing to W "in
contemplation of his death," for, so the argument goes, she already
·owned that which was in essence an undivided one-half interest
even before this arrangement. Under that circumstance, only the
one-half which H retained was included, for it remained a part of
his probate estate.21
In all three cases, the first statutory issue was whether the
phrase in the. contemplation-of-death provision, "interest ... of
which the decedent has ... made a transfer .. ·."22 was to be inter17 I.R.C., §2040. That section does not in so many words limit its direct applicability
to property which is jointly held at the moment of death. Read in context, however, that
must surely be its meaning. But see Estate of Harold W. Grant, 1 T.C. 731 (1943).
181.R.C. (1939), §811 (c), now I.R.C., §2035. (Italics supplied.)
19 See note 17 supra.
20 Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. No. 70 (1955); Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18
T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.), affd. on other issues (9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400.
21 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955).
221.R.C. (1939), §811 (c), now I.R.C., §2035.
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preted literally in accordance with H's contention or was to be
given a broad interpretation so that it would be geared to the
philosophy of the joint-property provision. Another way of putting
this question is to ask whether the previously-quoted key phrase
should be interpreted in accordance with the ownership and transfer principles prevailing under local law, or in accordance with the
tax concepts of ownership and transfer reflected in the joint-property provision of the estate tax act. Only in the latter event could
the husband be treated as though he owned the whole at the time
the parties entered into the final arrangement in contemplation of
his death.
But even if the latter more expansive interpretation should
prevail, there is an added question in the case where the entireties
property is divided between H and W. The additional question
here is whether such a division would be covered by a stated exception to the contemplation-of-death provision which immunizes
a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth." 23 Here three subsidiary questions are raised:
(1) Could such a transaction be considered "bona fide"? (2) Was
it a "sale"? (3) Was the giving up by the wife of her chance to
secure the whole through survivorship "full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth" for the release by him of
his chance to get the whole, each now taking one-half?
MANIFESTATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENTION
AND THE JUDICIARY'S :REACTION

The Initial Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Meaning
of "Interest ... of Which the Decedent Has . .. Made a Transfer."
When the estate tax act was first adopted in 1916, all matters
bearing on the determination of the gross estate were included in
one section.24 Its three subsections then specifically dealt only
with the following:
(1) The "interest ... of the decedent at the time of his death
which is subject to the payment of the charges against
his estate and the expenses of its administration and is
subject to distribution as part of his estate"; 25
23lbid.
24 Revenue Act of 1916, §202.
25 Now, as revised, I.R.C., §2033.

(Italics supplied.)
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(2) An "interest ... of which the decedent has ..• made a
transfer ... in contemplation of or intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death"; 26 and
(3) Jointly held property under the circumstances previously
described.27
The scanty committee reports of that day28 and the discussion
on the floor of Congress29 included nothing with reference to the
meaning of the word "interest" which appears in both of the first
two subsections. Nor was anything else said bearing on the question of whether Congress intended the contemplation-of-death
provision to reflect the ownership and transfer principles embodied in the joint-property provision. However, congressional
attention was called two years later to a number of the difficulties
which were then arising in the government's effort to fix the character of the ownership and transfer principles to be applied in
connection with the shot-gun clause of the act-the first of the
three subsections enumerated above. Illustratively, taxpayers' representatives were contending that nothing need be included in a
decedent's gross estate with reference either to the dower interest
of his surviving wife or his exercise· of a testamentary general
power of appointment.80
The developments relating to the powers-of-appointment question were to include the first legislative and judicial response to
the meaning of the statutory word "interest."
Claimed immunity for property with reference to which a decedent had exercised such a power at his death posed two separate
statutory issues under the shot-gun clause, only the first of which
is really relevant here:
(1) Did the ~ct that he had such a power mean that the
property subject to the power constituted an "interest ...
of the decedent"; and
(2) Even if it did, was his interest of such a character as to
satisfy the three added conjunctive conditions of the
shot-gun clause which provided that the government
divided between §§2035 and 2047 in I.R.C. (1954). (Italics supplied.)
revised, I.R.C., §2040,
28 One and a half pages were devoted to the whole of the first federal estate tax in
H. Rep. 922, 64th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3 and 5 (1916). Only one paragraph was devoted
to the subject in S. Rep. 793, 64th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1916).
29 See 53 CoNG, REc., Parts 11 and 13 (1916).
so See H. Rep. 767, 65th Cong., 2d sess., p. 211 (1918).
26 Now,

27 Now, as
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could reach the decedent's interest only to the extent
that the property was "subject to the payment of the
charges against his estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to distribution as part of his
estate."
Before these two issues were resolved by the judiciary, Congress in 1918 responded adversely, but only prospectively so, to
taxpayers' claims of immunity by incorporating new subsections
specifically dealing with powers of appointment as well as with
the dower interest of a surviving spouse.31
Those who drafted the new subsection bearing on the testamentary exercise of a power of appointment were aware that a
question also might thereafter arise as to whether Congress intended an (1) exercise of a (2) power during life but in contemplation of death to be equated with~ and thus covered by, that
language in the general contemplation-of-death provision which
literally embraced only a (1) "transfer" by a decedent of (2) an
"interest" in property. While the Congress itself responded to the
problem reflected by this question, it did not respond to the precise question itself. It attacked from the flank, and again only with
prospective effect, by including specific language in the power-ofappointment subsection calling for inclusion in a decedent's gross
estate where his power was exercised in contemplation of his
death.82 That this particular drafting technique was chosen to
resolve the anticipated difficulty did not necessarily mean, however, that Congress thought in 1918 that the general contemplation-of-death provision would fail by construction, in the case of
those who died prior to 1918, to reflect the ownership and transfer
concept which was now being embodied on a prospective basis
in the new power-of-appointment subsection. In fact, the sponsor- ·
ing committee's report stated that all of the foregoing changes
were "for the purpose of clarifying rather than extending the
existing statute.''33 But that the committee was not wholly sure
of this stated position may or may not have been indicated in one
of the succeeding sentences of the same report to the effect that
the "absence of a provision including property transferred by a
power of appointment makes it possible, by resorting to the creation of such a power, to effect two transfers of an estate with the
81 Revenue

Act of 1918, §402 (e), now reflected in I.R.C., §2041.
§420 (e), now reflected in I.R.C., §2041 (a) (1) (B) and (a) (2).
88 H. Rep. 767, 65th Cong., 2d sess., p. 21 (1918).
82 Id.,
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payment of only one tax." 34 The one tax to which that statement
referred was, of course, the tax originally paid by the donor of the
power.
Three years later, in United States v. Field,35 the Supreme
Court had occasion to deal .with the meaning of "interest" in both
of the first two original subsections. The context involved a decedent who had exercised a testamentary power of appointment,
having died before the effective date of the statutory changes
above. Taxability here turned first on the shot-gun clause. The
Court doubted that any weight could be attached to the belated
statement by the congressional committee to the effect that the
foregoing statutory changes simply clarified, without extending,
the sweep of the shot-gun clause. It noted in this connection that
the same report had indicated, as stated above, that absent those
statutory changes there would be no tax on the estate of the donee
of a power. It then relied upon local law in arriving at a negative
answer to the two enumerated issues noted above. In keeping
with general property law notions, it concluded first that the subject matter of the power was not the property of, i. e., was not the
"interest" of, -"the decedent."36 Nor with reference to the qualifying conditions of the shot-gun clause did the Court think the
property passed as a part of "his estate,"37 as distinguished from
the estate of the donor of the power.
The government also insisted that the second subsection of
the gross-estate provision justified the tax. That section, it will
be recalled, related to an "interest ... of which the decedent has
... made a transfer ... in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death... .'' 38 The
government argued that the testamentary exercise postponed the
possession or enjoyment of the beneficiary until decedent's death.39
at p. 22. (Italics supplied.)
257, 41 S.Ct. 256 (1921).
- 36 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (a), now, as modified, I.R.C., §2033.
87 The view was taken even though the decedent's creditors could have looked to the
appointed property for satisfaction of claims against that estate if the other assets were
insufficient. Significant here was the fact that any excess over creditors' claims went not
to the next of kin or to legatees but to appointees.
38 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (b), now divided between §§2035 and 2037, I.R.C. (1954).
(Italics supplied.)
39 While the court chose to meet the government's contention on the latter's own
ground, it could have also· rejected this contention on the theory that §202 (b) of the
Revenue Act of 1916, now divided between I.R.C., §§2035 and 2037, related only to inter
vivas transfers with a testamentary complexion and that §202 (a), now I.R.C., §2033, pre•
empted the field with reference to the shifting of interests where all facets of the transfer
34 Id.

35 255 U.S.
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Since the three qualifying conditions of the shot-gun clause had
not been repeated in this subsection, the basic issue to which the
Court addressed its attention was whether the word "interest"
here had the same meaning which had been given to it in the context of the shot-gun clause. The Court answered this affirmatively.
In short, the word "interest" in the subsection which also contained the general contemplation-of-death principle was said to
relate only to interests of the decedent as prescribed by local law.

The Subsequent Role of United States v. Field. Following
the Field decision, though we are not expressly told that it was
the cause, care was taken by Congress when new subsections were
added to the gross-estate provisions of the old code to insert language in the new subsection itself which would expressly tie the
new ownership and transfer principle proclaimed by it-again
nothing more nor less than a federal tax concept-to the contemplation-of-death principle. For example, the revocable-trust provision, adopted first in 1924, specifically provided, inter alia, that
a release in contemplation of death of the donor's reserved power
over the trust would bring into his gross estate that property subject to the power.40 However, the Congress never did go back to
the joint-property provision for the purpose of inserting an express link of this type.
It was with this background that a lower court first approached
the question with which this article is directly concerned. In
Estate of William MacPherson Horner,41 entireties property for
which the decedent-husband had originally furnished the consideration was transferred by the two spouses in contemplation of his
death to a trust, the income being reserved for their joint lives,.
then to the survivor for his life, remainder over, but with a possibility of reverter in the spouses. A power of revocation, never
to be exercised, was also retained by the two spouses for their
joint lives. The government sought to include the whole of the
corpus in the decedent-husband's gross estate.
took place at death. This reasoning would have centered attention only on the latter
subsection.
-!O Revenue Act of 1924, §302 (d), now I.R.C., §2038. Shortly thereafter Congress also
added special language in the revocable-transfer section tying that principle to the then
newly initiated presumption which was applied to transfers made shortly before death;
See Revenue Act of 1926, §302. Later the presumption was also linked to the powers-of.
appointment principle. Revenue Act of 1950, §501 (a), adding §811 (1) to I.R.C. (1939).
Both of these links are now consolidated in I.R.C., §2035 (b).
-!144 B.T.A. 1136 (1941).
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Since the reserved power was never exercised, the specific
language in the revocable-trust provision dealing with the exercise of such powers during life but in contemplation of death was,
of course, inapplicable. The case was to turn on other portions
of that subsection and on two other provisions, the same pivotal
issue being common to all three. These subsections dealt respectively with the tax effects of the possibility of reverter,42 the power
of revocation,43 and the fact that the trust had been established by
the spouses with entireties property in contemplation of H's
death. 44 All three subsections literally related only to that "interest" of which the "decedent" had made a "transfer." The common
question, therefore, was whether the ownership and transfer principle of the joint-property provision45 -a federal tax conceptwould be read into those other subsections.
Judge Sternhagen, in an opinion reviewed by the whole Board,
ignored without citation what had been said by the Supreme
Court in the Field case and now answered this affirmatively. He
stated that under these circumstances a "trust created by joint
tenants or tenants by the entirety has no greater force to keep the
property from the gross estate of one of the settlers than would a
similar trust created by an individual."46 Since the decedent's estate had failed to show that the transfer in trust, made within two
years of his death at age 76, was not made in contemplation of
death, "for this reason, if for no other, the property transferred
is within the gross estate." 47 Of course, he did add that the other
two subsections could also be invoked for the same reasons.
The common issue on which the Board had turned the case
was dodged by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit when
the matter came before it. That appellate court rested on the
questionable conclusion that the interest of the two parties in the
trust was still in the nature of a joint interest and was, therefore,
still covered by the joint-property provision.48 The Tax Court,
successor to the Board, continued, however, to adhere to its first
42Revenue Act of 1926, §302(c), now I.R.C., §2037.
4Sid., §302(d), now-I.R.C., §2038.
44 Id., §302 (c), now I.R.C., §2035.
45 Id., §302 (e), now I.R.C., §2040.
4644 B.T.A. 1136 at 1140 (1941).
47 Id. at 1139.
48 Homer's Estate v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 649.
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philosophy4 9 and was finally joined on the point in 1943 by the
above appellate court.50
The Tax Court applied its view in cases where the husband
and wife transferred the entireties property to third persons in
contemplation of his death,51 where the husband transferred his
remaining undivided interest to his wife,52 and where such property was divided between them.53 In the latter situations, however,
that tribunal was also compelled to consider the additional issue
of whether the division between the spouses was a "bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." This immunizing language was thought not to apply for
three reasons. 54 A transaction between spouses, designed solely
for the purpose of reducing estate taxes, was not considered "bona
fide." Less persuasive, if only for reasons of policy, was the conclusion that the word "sale" did not embrace exchanges, bona
fide or otherwise. And most persuasive was the conclusion that
any quid pro quo which failed to replenish the decedent's taxable
estate fell short of "full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth." The legislative history of another provision afforded some indirect support -for this latter construction.
In this latter connection, after Congress had added the provision which specifically required the dower interest of a decedent's surviving spouse to be included in the decedent's gross
49Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d)
657; Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) (acq.); Estate of Harold W. Grant, 1 T.C.
731 (1943).
50 The Tax Court's theory was adopted in Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh
v. Driscoll, (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 949, which was then affd. per curiam (3d Cir. 1943)
137 F. (2d) 653, cert. den. 321 U.S. 764, 64 S.Ct. 521 (1944).
51 Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 657.
52 Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) (acq.). Cf. Estate of Harold W. Grant,
1 T.C. 731 (1943).
58 Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d)
657. The transfer concept of the joint-property section was also read by the Tax Court
into the section of the old code dealing with insurance. However, the language of that
provision, I.R.C. (1939), §811 (g) (2), was somewhat more accommodating than is the language of the contemplation-of-death provision. The insurance section provided, inter alia,
that insurance proceeds would be included in a decedent's gross estate in the proportion
to which he had "directly or indirectly" paid the premiums. Where the surviving wife
paid the premiums from a joint bank account traceable originally to separate funds of her
decedent-husband, the latter was said to have indirectly paid them. Estate of A. D.
Saunders, 14 T.C. 534 (1950). Cf. Rule v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 351.
As applied to community.property, this concept was codified in the provision dealing with
insurance. Revenue Act of 1942, §404 (a), adding §811 (g) (4) to I.R.C. (1939).
54Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d)
657.
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estate,55 the question arose whether a contract between spouses,
calling upon H to leave a sum to W in lieu of dower, was supported
for tax purposes by full and adequate consideration so as to justify
a subsequent deduction for a claim filed by the surviving spouse.
Accompanying a subsequent specific and adverse legislative response to this56 was the sponsoring congressional committee's
comment that previous contrary holdings amounted "to a subversion of the legislative intent" 57 reflected in the earlier provision
which called for inclusion of dower in the gross estate. This was
some indication that Congress contemplated that "full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth" was not satisfied
by a quid pro quo which, in the absence of the transaction in
question, would have been included in any ev:ent in the decedent's
gross estate. Later in 1945 the Supreme Court in Merrill v. Fahs5 8
indicated that the above amendment by Congress was simply declaratory of the meaning which would have been assigned, absent
the amel}.dment, to the full-and-adequate-consideration requirement. However, in 1949 the appellate court for the Ninth Circuit, concerned with a division of entireties property between the
spouses in contemplation of the -husband's death, ignored the
implications of the Merrill decision. But of even more sweeping
effect was its total rejection also of the Tax Court's views with
reference to the relationship between the contemplation-of-death
provision and the joint-property subsection.59
That appellate court concluded that the contemplation-ofdeath provision was not in pari materia with the joint-property
subsection. While no reference was made to the Supreme Court's
much earlier analysis in the Field case, this court of appeals did,.
nevertheless, conclude that the contemplation-of-death provision
was geared under these circumstances to the principles of ownership prevailing under local law. Accordingly, that court could not
see how it could be said that a husband had transferred in contemplation of his death an interest which his wife already owned
in their entireties property. Having reached that conclusion it
was relatively unimportant in this case that the court also refused
to subscribe to the trial court's view with reference to the meaning
55 Revenue Act of 19i8, §402 (b), now I.R.C., §2034.
56 Revenue Act of 1932, §804, now I.R.C., §§2053 (d)
57 H. Rep. 708, 72d Cong., 1st sess., p. 47 (1932).
58 324 U.S. 308, 65 S.Ct. 655 (1945).

and 2043 (b).

59Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 657.
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of the full-and-adequate-consideration clause. It seemed, nevertheless, to think that the Tax Court's view on this matter was simply
another way, a backhanded one at that, of reading the tax concept
of ownership reflected in the joint-property provision into the
contemplation-of-death subsection.
That same appellate court had another opportunity in the
same year to reaffirm its overall philosophy. A husband and wife
in contemplation of his death voluntarily divided community
property which was traceable to his earnings. They were attempting to avoid that language which was inserted into a new
paragraph in the joint-property subsection in 1942 calling for
inclusion in the husband's gross estate of the entire value of that
community property which had originated with him. In keeping
with earlier practice, Congress had simultaneously written into
that same paragraph a provision tying that particular ownership
principle, a tax concept, to the contemplation-of-death principle.60
Unfortunately, however, those two principles were expressly
linked in the new paragraph only in the case where such community property was transferred by the husband and wife to a
third person. This meant that a division of such property between
spouses in contemplation of the husband's death would result in
inclusion of the whole in his gross estate only if the general contemplation-of-death provision was deemed to embody the tax
concept of ownership reflected in the then new provision dealing
with community property. But again the court in question insisted
that the general contemplation-of-death provision could not be
so construed. 61 A little more than a month later, however, Congress furnished some evidence, if only by implication, that it
thought the transfer concept in the general contemplation-ofdeath provision was sufficiently elastic to embrace at least one
federal tax concept as distinguished from the principle prevailing
under local law.
The medium for this expression was the Technical Changes
Act of 1949.62 There, it will be recalled, Congress, inter alia,
sought to cushion the alleged hardship which arose out of the
judicially-inspired but long delayed demise of May v. Heiner. 63
60 Revenue Act of 1942, §402 (a), ·adding §811 (d) (5) to I.R.C. (1939).
61 Rickenberg v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den.

338 U.S. 949,
70 S.Ct. 487 (1950).
62 Act of Oct. 25, 1949, PL. 378, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. L 891.
63 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286 (1930), overruled by Commissioner v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322 (1949), reh. den. 336 U.S. 915, 69 S.Ct. 599 (1949).
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Back in 1931 Congress had inserted into an old subsection,
dealing with transfers in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the decedent's death,
specific language to the effect that there would also be included
in the gross estate any property which a decedent transferred
after that date if he retained the income or the possession and
enjoyment for his life. 64 That amendment was further expanded
in 1932 to reach cases where, inter alia, an interest in the income
was retained for a period which was not ascertainable without
reference to the decedent's death. 65 Neither of these amendments
of that old subsection expressly identified the tax consequence
which would follow if such a decedent subsequently, but during
life, sought to escape the impact of that language by an assignment or surrender of his retained life estate in contemplation of
his death. Literally, the precise subject matter of that second
transfer would have no value at his death, for the life estate would
be exhausted coincident with that pivotal dateline. Accordingly,
if the phrase which was common to the whole subsection,
"interest ... of which the decedent has ... made a transfer," was
construed in a contemplation of death context so as to embrace
only the notions of ownership and transfer prevailing under local
law, there would be nothing to include in such a decedent's gross
estate. On the other hand, the corpus itself would be included if
that phrase was deemed to reflect the overall tax transfer concept
of the 1931 and 1932 amendments.
That Congress at least later supposed in 1949 that the latter
would be the case is indicated by the way in which it referred to
the problem in the Technical Changes Act of that year. There, of
course, it was primarily concerned with the fact that the Supreme
Court had just held under other language of the same s~bsection
(the traditional "possession and enjoyment" clause) that transfers
before 193 I would also be included in the gross estate if the decedent had retained a life estate.66 In cushioning the alleged hardship of this holding, Congress first provided that life estates
reserved prior to the pivotal dateline, 1931, could be assigned
64 Joint Res. of March 3, 1931, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 46 Stat. L. 1516, now in I.R.C.,
§2036. It took a decision by the -Supreme Court to demonstrate that this amendment was
only to have prospective effect. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938).
65 Revenue Act of 1932, §803 (a), now in I.R.C., §2036.
66 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322 (1949), reh. den. 336
U.S. 915, 69 S.Ct. 599 (1949).
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during 1949 and 1950 without gift tax incidence.67 More important here, however, was the further provision to the effect that
such assignments would "not be deemed to have been made in
contemplation of death.... " 68 It does not expressly appear whether Congress deemed it absolutely necessary that it express this
dispensation. But that it thought so appears from the further fact
that the previously quoted negative and immunizing statement
with reference to contemplation of death was said not to apply to
the assignment, inter alia, of a retained life estate if the original
transfer of the corpus was made between 1931 and 1932 and if
that corpus would have been reached, absent the subsequent assignment of the income interest, by the 1931 amendment standing
alone. 69 On the one hand, it is true that Congress used a double
negative. It did not affirmatively say that the one word, "interest,"
which identified the subject matter of the contemplation-of-death
clause as well as that of the possession-and-enjoyment clause, was
to be interpreted in such case so as to include the entire corpus.
But that seems obviously to have been the legislative supposition.
And while nothing whatever was said with reference to such assignments of a retained life estate where the original inter vivos
transfer of the corpus was made after 1932, it would be difficult
to argue persuasively that Congress intended that assignments of
such life estates, though in contemplation of death, would free the
corpus of the death duty. Yet literally, taxability of the corpus
would follow only if a court would read the special tax-transfer
concept, relating to retained life estates, into the general contemplation-of-death clause. However, if the legislative intention was
clear, though not adequately expressed, it is not unknown for a
court to conform the statute to the intention. Indeed, in other
contexts the Supreme Court has so responded even where the
statutory words were exactly opposite to the legislative intention
otherwise expressed.70
Without expressly considering the indirect significance of any
of this legislative history, the Tax Court in 1952 shifted its long67 Act

of Oct. 25, 1949, P.L. 378, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. L. 891, §8. Cf. §6.
Ibid. By virtue of the provisions in the new code, freeing from tax those transfers
which originated before March 3, 1931, this provision has lost its practical importance.
I.R.C., §2036.
69 The same was true if the property would have been reached, absent the assignment,
under I.R.C. (1939), §811 (d).
70 Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938), where the Court relied upon a
statement made on the floor of the House to completely neutralize language to the contrary in the statute.
68
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standing position by adopting the view of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to the effect that the words "interest" and
"transfer" in the contemplation-of-death provision were geared to
the ownership principles prevailing under local law and thus did
not incorporate the tax concepts reflected in the joint-property
subsection. 71 This attitude was solidified by two like decisions in
1955.72 Indeed, in the interim, even the Commissioner conceded
that this was the case with reference to situations which arose prior
to 1948 where community property traceable to the husband's
earnings was divided between the spouses in contemplation of his
death. 73 But that particular situation might be distinguished from
cases involving other types of jointly held property where, prior
to the last transaction, there was a right of survivorship. Congress
had inserted into the community-property paragraphs an all too
narrow specific link between transfers of community property and
the contemplation-of-death principle, and might thereby be said
to have pre-empted the community property field. In any event
the government did continue thereafter to litigate in the context
of other types of jointly held property the basic question with
which this article is concerned.74 Now, however, while the evidence is inconclusive, there is some reason to believe that the government may have given up the ghost.75

The Effect of the 1954 Code. The only new provision added
by the 1954 code which might affect the answer to the problem
considered here is to be found in that chapter of the new code
which deals with gift taxes.
Section 2515 now provides that the creation of, or the enlargement of the equity in, a joint tenancy between spouses in real
property, or a similar entireties estate, is not to be deemed a
trans/er for purposes of that chapter unless the donor elects
71 Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.), affd. on other issues
(9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400.
72 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955); Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C.
No. 70 (1955).
73 U.S. Treas. Dec. 6016, May 29, 1953, amending U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.15.
74 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955); Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C.
No. 70 (1955).
75 In October 1955 it acquiesced in Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488
(1952) (acq.), affd. {9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400, almost two months before it tested
the same issue in the Carnall and Bomer cases. Int. Rev. Bui. 1955-41, p. 7. Cf. the government's admission back in 1951 in Steen v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1951) 51-1 U.S.T.C.
,il0,818, alfd. on other issues (9th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 379, cert. den. 344 U.S. 822, 73
~n~~

.
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otherwise in a gift tax return. Now the donor spouse will normally
be deemed to have made a gift on the termination (other than by
reason of death) of such estates to the extent the proportion of
the proceeds received by such spouse is less than the proportion
of the total original consideration furnished by him.
Importation now of this ownership and transfer principle into
the contemplation-of-death provision would certainly seem to require the Tax Court to shift the position which it has recently
been taking in the cases first discussed. Unfortunately, however,
it is not at all clear that the principle of the above provision will
be imported into the general contemplation-of-death clause.76 The
literal language of the new provision specifically limits its applicability to the gift tax chapter. The contemplation-of-death provision resides elsewhere, in the preceding chapter which covers the
estate tax. However, since the gift tax was intended to supplement
the estate tax, it is common for courts to treat them in pari materia.
Indeed, the Supreme Court did just that in a previously discussed
case which raised a problem somewhat similar to that involved
here. It will be recalled in this connection that the claims provision in the subchapter of the old code on estate taxes was amended
to provide that the relinquishment by contract of dower or other
marital rights in return for other promised benefits would not
satisfy the previously existing statutory requirement calling for
full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.77
While the language of that amendment specifically limited its
applicability to that "subchapter," the Court did, nevertheless,
subsequently import the same meaning into the full-and-adequateconsideration provision of the separate subchapter covering the
gift tax act.78 However, the two situations may not be exactly parallel, for the Court there also seemed to think that it would have
reached the same result under the full-and-adequate-consideration
clause of the gift tax act even in the absence of this amendment
of the estate tax act.
The problem considered by this article will not be adequately
solved even if this statutory gift-tax principle is imported into
the contemplation-of-death provision. The new amendment re76 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND EsrATE TAXATION §52.03 (10)
(1954) assumes that the new principle of the gift tax chapter will be imported into the
estate tax act.
77 Revenue Act of 1932, §804, reflected later in I.R.C. (1939), §812 (b), now in I.R.C.,
§§2053 (d) and 2043 (b).
78 Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 65 S.Ct. 655 (1945).
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lates only to cases which satisfy certain cumulative requirements,
that is, relates only to joint interests (1) in real property, (2) between husband and wife, (3) which are created or enlarged after
the effective date of the 1954 code, and (4) where the donor fails
to elect in a gift tax return to treat the creation of the tenancy as
a present gift. The first and third of these, limiting that provision
to real property and even then to estates created after, or to the
equity enlarged after, the effective date of the new code, provide
blind spots of significant proportions. An adequate marriage
between the contemplation-of-death principle and the joint-property provision will, therefore, require something more, either
from the judiciary or the Congress.
CONCLUSION

·Admittedly, a taxpayer does have the right "to decrease the
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by means which the law permits." 79 But except as this indicates, as the Supreme Court intended, that the taxpayer's motive
in fixing the shape of his affairs is usually irrelevant,80 the quoted
statement is not very useful in resolving specific cases like the one
under consideration. It begs the pivotal question. The central
issue remains: what does the law permit?81 In determining this,
obviously the judiciary's function is to implement the legislative
prescription, not to undo that which Congress has done. Accordingly, in determining the thrust of the contemplation-of-death
provision, appropriate importapce must be attached to its exact
language. But there is also another important policy which is
sometimes spoken of as though it were cast in a competing role.
On one occasion, the Supreme Court put it as follows:
"But the true meaning of a single section of a statute in a
setting as complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its language, cannot be ascertained if it be considered
apart from related sections or if the mind be isolated from
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 at 469, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
of course, it is quite relevant. The statute itself makes it relevant under
the contemplation-of-death provision with reference to the death duty treatment of inter
vivos gifts. I.R.C., §2035. Also in the very case wherein the quoted remark was made by
the Supreme Court, the taxpayer was deprived of the tax advantage which the literal
words of the statute accorded him. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
81 See Judge Clark's dissent in Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1956) 232 F.
(2d) 118 at 128. See also Eisenstein, "A Case of Deferred Compensation," 4 TAX L. REv.
391 (1949).
79

80 Sometimes,
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the history of the ... tax legislation of which it is an integral
part." 82
While the broad outlines of the two foregoing rules of construction are clear enough, abstract statements of those standards
do not precisely identify the result which should be reached in a
specific case. For example, what does the law permit when the
language of one section might well be so construed, when isolated,
as to fall short of fulfilling the logical function of that section
when it is read in the context of the philosophy of another, perhaps related, section? More specifically, exactly how clear must be
the general purpose of the whole statute and the so-called literal
meaning of one section for· the former in a given instance to affect
the latter in the necessary degree to resolve the specific case?
In the more or less twilight type of case, the judiciary should
resolve the matter by balancing the interests reflected in each of
the two loosely woven rules of construction. The goal, of course,
is to determine the manifested congressional purpose.
This method, one of balancing, provides the real explanation
for such otherwise unrelated Supreme Court cases like Helvering
v. Clifford83 and Commissioner v. Tower. 84 The weight to be
assigned in any given case to each of those principles, when they
seem to be cast in somewhat competing roles, becomes a question
of degree. And because it is just such a question, little differences
in the setting,85 in the degree to which application of each serves
clearly to prove the congressional purpose,86 or in judges, can
count for much.87
This is aptly illustrated by comparing the problem in the
Tower and Cliffora cases with the problem central to this article.
Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121 at 124, 55 S.Ct. 60 (1934).
309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940), dealing with short term trusts with reference to
which the grantor retained a substantial reversion and significant powers of management.
84 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946), wherein a family partnership was ignored for
tax purposes though it was valid under local law. Cf. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337
U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949).
811 Cf. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58 (1930), with Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111, 50 S.Ct. 241 (1930).
86 In Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938), the literal language of the
statute was directly opposite to a statement made on the floor by the spokesman for the
House Ways and Means Committee. Since the Congress hurriedly passed the new provision on the basis of the oral statement and without even waiting for the bill itself to be
printed and distributed to the membership, the Court felt that the oral statement should
take priority in representing the manifest congressional purpose.
87 Cf. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949, with Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946).
82
83
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There, in an income tax context, the Supreme Court was really
weighing the relative significance of the basic purposes of the
income tax law, gleaned by it from the progressive rate structure
and old section 22 (a) which defined gross income,88 against the
seemingly contrary thrust, if applied to those cases, of other language which dealt specifically with partnerships89 and trusts. 90 In
balancing the interests of the two competing principles, effect was
finally given to what the Court believed to be the basic purposes
of the law. This was accomplished by saying that the language of
the partnership and trust provisions, though literally applicable,
did not apply to those particular cases. The consequence was that
taxpayers were denied the opportunity to get away with something which many thought Congress by those specific sections had
literally permitted.
While the result which followed there from balancing the
interests of the two principles previously described is now clear,
the extent to which a given court in a somewhat different case
will emphasize one to the prejudice of the other is not at all clear.
Again little differences may count for much. In the Tower and
Clifford cases the Court was asked to say that a provision containing broad language, old section 22 (a), overrode another section.,
the specific and more narrow language of which was literally applicable. In making its choice, i.e., in choosing to support what it
gathered was the basic purpose of the act, the Court was clearly
aided and comforted by the exceedingly sweeping character of
the language of the broader provision. In our situation, on the
other hand, we are asking whether a court should impute a tax
notion of ownership to language unfortunately narrow when read
in the strict property sense in order more fully to effectuate the
underlying purpose which provided the only justification for that
section. For how much should this difference count?
Actually, of course, the relevance of that difference need not
be considered in a vacuum. Before such a court also should be the
reaction of an earlier high Court, reflected in the Field case, to
the key phrase, common then to the contemplation-of-death and
the possession-and-enjoyment paragraphs of the same subsection,
88 Now I.R.C., §61.
so I.R.C. (1939), §182 et seq., now in I.R.C., §702. A special provision which now
deals with the problem of that case appears in I.R.C., §704 (e).
90 I.R.C. (1939), §161 et seq., now as modified, I.R.C., §641 et seq. Special provisions
have now been added to deal with the problem posed by that case. I.R.C., §673 et seq.
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which read "interest ... of which the decedent has ... made a
transfer." The view there expressed by certain justices who were
all too prone in tax cases to lay down broad abstract principles91
was that those words reflected the property and transfer concepts
which prevailed under local law. It was one thing, however, for
the Supreme Court to say this in an effort to show that the language
in question should not be construed to reflect a special tax concept,
relating to powers of appointment, which Congress itself did not
concoct until later, after that decedent had died. It would be something else again to say that the contemplation-of-death provision
was also a stranger to those special tax concepts which were enacted simultaneously with it. This difference furnishes an intelligent, though not necessarily compelling, basis by which the Field
case could be distinguished by present-day justices who have
already indicated elsewhere, though not always consistently, a
belief in empirical case-by-case analysis and a reluctance to attach
a magic quality to earlier generalizations.92
Even more favorable to the government's position is the significance which might well be attached to the negative approach
made by the Congress in the Technical Changes Act of 1949.93
Its forc;e here is to be distinguished from that of earlier instances where newly enacted tax concepts of ownership and transfer were affirmatively linked to the contemplation-of-death principle by special language incorporated in the body of the new
subsections. The different, i.e., the negative, approach of the
Technical Changes Act would seem to demonstrate that Congress
contemplated that the general contemplation-of-death provision
itself embraced at the very least the federal tax concept of
ownership and transfer reflected in the retained-life-estate provision. To that extent, a court as a minimum should treat the 1949
statutory language as an implied amendment of the meaning to be
attached to that phrase in the contemplation-of-death provision
which reads "interest . . . of which the decedent has . . . made a
transfer." 94 And since the prescription ~here was accomplished by
91 See the analysis of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920), and its
aftermath in Wright, "The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme
Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts," 8 STAN. L. REv. 164 (1956).
92 See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter's approach in Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737,
67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947). Cf. Justice Warren's approach in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 75 S.Ct. 473 (1955).
93 Act of October 25, 1949, P .L. 378, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. L. 891, §8.
94 Now I.R.C., §2035.
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use of negative phraseology, reinforced by a double negative, there
would seem to be no substantial reason to suppose that the legislative supposition contemplated the attribution to that phrase of
one congressionally acceptable tax concept of "interest" and not
another. At least this should be true in the case of other tax concepts of ownership and transfer (illustratively that of the jointproperty provision) to which the Congress is equally committed
and the justification for which is equal to that of the retained-lifeestate provision.95
That the justification for the transfer concept of the jointproperty provision is equal to that of the retained-life-estate provision is important only because it deprives the Tax Court of a
distinction which it has been willing to draw elsewhere. That
court recently indicated that the key phrase quoted above, when
repeated in different subsections, did not carry the same meaning.
When it affirmed in 1955 that the meaning of that phrase was
geared to local property law,96 it distinguished one of its early
contrary holdings, 97 ignoring the others. 98 It asserted that in the
earlier case the inter vivos arrangement entered into between the
spouses regarding their jointly held property, and in contemplation of the husband's death, was accompanied also by their retention of a joint power of revocation.
Attempted reconciliation of the cases on this basis means that
the key phrase, "interest ... of which the decedent has ... made
a transfer," which serves also to limit that subsection dealing with
revocable transfers,99 does in that context incorporate the tax
concept of ownership reflected in the joint-property provision
though the opposite is said to be true of ~hat phrase when lodged
in the context of ·the contemplation-of-death principle. This is not
the only situation in which the courts have indicated, and perhaps
quite properly, that the Congress is most closely wedded to the
basic philosophy of the revocable-transfer section and that fulfillment of its legitimate function requires that it be given the broad95 The latter is justified on the ground that the decedent retained the entire income
or use of the property until the moment of his death. The former is justified on the
theory that while he retained only one-half of the income or use for that period, he also
retained a chance until his death of recapturing the entire corpus.
96 Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. No. 70 (1955).
97Estate of William MacPherson Hornor, 44 B.T.A. 1136 (1941) (nonacq.), affd. (3d
Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 649. ·
98 Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd, by (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d)
657; Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) (acq.).
99 I.R.C. (1939), §811 (d), now I.R.C., §2038.

1956]

JOINT PROPERTY AND CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

25

est possible meaning.100 However, in resolving the basic question
with which this article is concerned, it is doubtful that the varying
degrees of congressional devotion to different tax concepts of
ownership justifies the judiciary in treating the contemplation of
death section as a stranger to the jointly held property provision.
After all, Congress has indicated by the Technical Changes Act of
1949 that it did not consider the transfer principle in the retainedlife-estate subsection as a stranger to the contemplation-of-death
provision. Why should we suppose otherwise in the case of another
equally legitimate theory of ownership contained in -the jointlyheld property provision?
From the foregoing considerations, it appears on balance that
the congressionally manifested purpose favors that construction of
the contemplation-of-death provision which incorporates in it the
ownership and transfer doctrine contained in the joint-property
provision. But there is room here for a difference of opinion. One
cannot say that the Tax Court was clearly wrong in treating the
two provisions as strangers. Because the basic question is of that
type, and because the tendency of the lower courts is to favor the
100 That the Congress does not think such trusts have much substance is evident from
the fact that from an early date the corpus has been included in the transferor's gross
estate [Revenue Act of 1924, §302 (d), now as revised, I.R.C., §2038] and the income
therefrom was taxable to him until his death. Revenue Act of 1924, §219 (g), now as
revised, I.R.C., §676. By way of comparison, while the former is true in the case of certain
gifts in contemplation of death (I.R.C., §2035), the latter is not.
In any event, on the one hand, the Tax Court has held that the pivotal statutory
phrase around which this article is written served in a contemplation-of-death context
to exclude from the gross estate the income from a corpus which was accumulated after
the original transfer. Estate of James E. Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979 (1947), reh. 11 T.C. 576
(1948), affd. Burns v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 739. However, that court
has reached a contrary result with reference to the accumulated income of a trust over
which the transferor retained a power of revocation. Estate of E. A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902
(1950), remanded and vacated per stipulation of the parties, (5th Cir. 1951) 51-2 U.S.T.C.
,rl0,832; Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949). Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of
James D. McDermott, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 665; Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40
B.T.A. 181 (1939), modified and affd. (2d Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 469, cert. den. 314 U.S.
621, 62 S.Ct. 66 (1941).
The effect under the estate tax act of reaching the accumulated income of a revocable
trust is to treat such transferred property as though it would have been embraced by
I.R.C. (1954), §2033. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that §2033 would not,
standing alone, have reached property now covered by the revocable-transfer section. See
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S.Ct. 451 (1933).
Any implication from this, that the contemplation-of-death provision would not have
embraced the ownership and transfer principle of the revocable-transfer section, would
not demonstrate that the contemplation-of-death principle should also be a stranger to
the joint-held property transfer concept. All that was said above about the Field case is
equally applicable here.

26

MICHIGAN LAW

R.Evmw

[Vol. 55

taxpayer who engages in what is obviously a "gimmick," this
writer is led to say that immediate statutory revision is warranted
to stop that tendency and thus to neutralize the gimmick. At the
same time this will afford the Congress an opportunity to fix the
relationship between the jointly-held property provision and certain other special tax concepts, such as those contained in sections
2036, 2037, and 2038.

